மூன்றாவது ஏகாதிபத்திய உலகப் பொருளாதார பொது நெருக்கடி

ENB.COM இப்பகுதியில் மூன்றாவது ஏகாதிபத்திய உலகப் பொருளாதார பொது நெருக்கடி குறித்த விசயதானங்கள் தொகுக்கப்படுகின்றன. உலக மக்கள் இரு பெரும் உலகப் போர்களை எதிர்கொண்டனர். இவற்றுக்கு இரு ஏகாதிபத்திய உலகப் பொருளாதார நெருக்கடிகள் காரணமாய் இருந்தன. தற்போது மூன்றாவது ஏகாதிபத்திய உலகப் பொருளாதார பொது நெருக்கடியை மனித குலத்தின் மீது ஏகாதிபத்தியவாதிகள் சுமத்தியுள்ளனர். அது மட்டுமல்ல இந்நெருக்கடிக்கு உடனடித் தீர்வாக நடக்கும் பிராந்திய யுத்தங்களும், இதன் முழு வளர்ச்சியாய் தவிர்க்க இயலாமல் நடந்து தீரவேண்டிய மூன்றாவது உலக யுத்தமும் இனி வரும் காலத்தின் மனித சமூக அரசியல் வாழ்வின் மீது தீர்க்கமான பாத்திரத்தை ஆற்றப்போகின்றன. இது பற்றிய அறிவாய்ந்த முடிவுகள் இல்லாமல் நமது காலத்தின் மீது ஆளுமை செலுத்துவது சற்றும் இயலாததாகும். இங்கே தொகுக்கப்படும் ஆக்கங்கள் ' இயக்கவியல் பொருள்முதல்வாத ஆய்வு முறையில்' சிந்திக்கப்பட்டவையல்ல. அச் சிந்தனையில் அமைந்த ஆய்வுக்கு செறிவான தகவல்களைத் தருகின்றன என்ற தகுதியில் மட்டுமே அவை இங்கே இடம்பெறுகின்றன.அவ் ஆக்கங்களின் உரிமையாளர்களான எழுத்தாளர்களுக்கும், நிறுவனங்களுக்கும் நமது நன்றிகள். ENB

Tuesday, 6 October 2009

Europe's plot to take over the world

Europe's plot to take over the world
By Gideon Rachman
Published: October 6 2009 03:00 Last updated: October 6 2009 03:00
At last! Ireland has passed the Lisbon treaty and now the European Union can move forward with its plan for world domination. Within months, the EU is likely to appoint a president and a foreign minister.
Tony Blair is limbering up for a run at the top job. A clutch of Swedish, Dutch and Belgian candidates are jostling for the post of foreign minister.
Fortified by its new foreign-policy structures, the Union is staking a claim to be taken seriously as a global superpower. David Miliband, Britain's foreign secretary, says: "It shouldn't be a G2 of the US and
China. There should be a G3 with the European Union."
But what happens in Brussels - or even in trilateral dealings between the US, China and Europe - is a sideshow. The real key to Europe's global ambitions is the Group of 20.
Jean Monnet, the founding father of the EU, believed that European unity was "not an end in itself, but only a stage on the way to the organised world of tomorrow". His successors in Brussels make no secret
of the fact that they regard the Union's brand of supranational governance as a global model.
The realisation that the G20 is Europe's Trojan horse struck me at the G20's last summit in Pittsburgh a couple of weeks ago. The surroundings and atmosphere were strangely familiar. And then I understood;
I was back in Brussels, and this was just a global version of a European Union summit.
It was the same drill and format. The leaders' dinner the night before the summit; a day spent negotiating an impenetrable, jargon-stuffed communiqué; the setting-up of obscure working groups; the national
briefing rooms for the post-summit press conferences.
All of these procedures are deeply familiar to European leaders - but rather new to the Asian and American leaders whom the Europeans are carefully entangling in this new structure. Watching an Indonesian
delegate wandering, apparently carefree, through the conference centre in Pittsburgh, I felt a stab of pity. "You don't know what you are getting into," I thought. "You are going to waste the rest of your life
talking about fish quotas." (Or, this being the G20, carbon-emission quotas.)
The Europeans did not just set the tone at the G20 - they also dominate proceedings, since they are grossly over-represented. Huge countries such as Brazil, China, India and the US are represented by one
leader each. The Europeans managed to secure eight slots around the conference table for Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, the president of the European Commission and the president
of the European Council. Most of the key international civil servants present were also Europeans: Dominique Strauss-Kahn, head of the International Monetary Fund; Pascal Lamy of the World Trade
Organisation; Mario Draghi of the Financial Stability Board.
As a result, the Europeans seemed much more tuned into what was going on than some of the other delegations. Puzzling over the new powers given to the IMF to monitor national economic policies in the
Pittsburgh conclusions, I was interrupted by an old friend from the European Commission, who recognised the language immediately. "Ah yes," she said, "the open method of co-ordination."
But does any of this really matter? After all, EU summits and statements have become a byword for tortuous and ineffective machinations that often have little real-world effect. The process that gave birth to
the Lisbon treaty started eight years ago. Even after Ireland's Yes vote, Lisbon could still be derailed by recalcitrant governments in the Czech Republic or Britain.
However, the saga of Lisbon can be read another way. Once the EU gets its teeth into an issue, it never really lets go. Processes started at EU summits - which often seem minor bits of bureaucratic paper-
shuffling - often turn out to have important political implications, years later. The same could well be true of some of the decisions made in Pittsburgh - such as the language on tax havens and bankers' bonuses.
From the very start, the EU advanced through small, apparently technical, steps focusing on economic issues - the so-called "Monnet method". Monnet himself believed that Europe would be built through "the
common management of common problems". Is this so very different from President Barack Obama's recent appeal for "global solutions to global problems"?
Of course, there is still a huge gap between the capabilities of the modern EU and those of the G20. There is no army of G20 civil servants to match the bureaucrats of Brussels. There is no body of G20 law
and no G20 court to enforce the group's decisions. Nor is there much immediate prospect that the US or China - both countries that zealously guard their sovereignty - will cede any serious powers to a G20
law-making body.
Yet the kernel of something new has been created. To understand its potential, it is worth going back to the Schuman Declaration of 1950, which started the process of European integration. "Europe," it said,
"will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity."
The G20 now has some achievements and a burgeoning sense of solidarity between the members of this new, most exclusive, club. Who knows what comes next?

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